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ABSTRACT
Machine Learning (ML) solutions are nowadays distributed and are prone to var-
ious types of component failures, which can be encompassed in so-called Byzan-
tine behavior. This paper introduces LIUBEI, a Byzantine-resilient ML algorithm
that does not trust any individual component in the network (neither workers nor
servers), nor does it induce additional communication rounds (on average), com-
pared to standard non-Byzantine resilient algorithms. LIUBEI builds upon gradi-
ent aggregation rules (GARs) to tolerate a minority of Byzantine workers. Besides,
LIUBEI replicates the parameter server on multiple machines instead of trusting it.
We introduce a novel filtering mechanism that enables workers to filter out replies
from Byzantine server replicas without requiring communication with all servers.
Such a filtering mechanism is based on network synchrony, Lipschitz continuity
of the loss function, and the GAR used to aggregate workers’ gradients. We also
introduce a protocol, scatter/gather, to bound drifts between models on correct
servers with a small number of communication messages. We theoretically prove
that LIUBEI achieves Byzantine resilience to both servers and workers and guaran-
tees convergence. We build LIUBEI using TensorFlow, and we show that LIUBEI
tolerates Byzantine behavior with an accuracy loss of around 5% and around 24%
convergence overhead compared to vanilla TensorFlow. We moreover show that
the throughput gain of LIUBEI compared to another state–of–the–art Byzantine–
resilient ML algorithm (that assumes network asynchrony) is 70%.
1 INTRODUCTION
Scaling Machine Learning (ML) algorithms with existing datasets and models Kim (2012) calls
for distributed solutions Li et al. (2014); Meng et al. (2016); Chilimbi et al. (2014). The standard
distribution approach nowadays is the parameter server architecture Li et al. (2013). Such an archi-
tecture employs two types of machines: workers and parameter servers. Typically, workers perform
the model update computation, following today’s standard workhorse algorithm for ML: stochastic
gradient descent (SGD). The parameter server updates the model in each iteration after aggregating
gradients from workers. Based on this, the typical iteration execution includes two communication
rounds: workers pull a model from the server, which in turn then pulls gradients from workers.
However, such a solution is prone to a various amount of failures of the distributed system com-
ponents. Centralizing the parameter server in one machine makes it prone to a crash failure that
can then stop the entire learning procedure. Various kinds of failures, including software bugs,
hardware defects, or even hacked machines, can lead to corrupted gradients, diverging the learning
process Baruch et al. (2019); Xie et al. (2019). Such behavior can be abstracted in the most gen-
eral form of failures, namely Byzantine failures Lamport et al. (1982), modeling the very fact that
a machine in the system behaves arbitrarily. Given the increasing use of ML in mission-critical
applications Esteva et al. (2017); Rao & Frtunikj (2018), tolerating such failures is crucial.
Byzantine ML solutions so far mostly focused on Byzantine workers, ignoring the possibility of
Byzantine servers. Typically, a statistically-robust gradient aggregation rule (GAR) is employed by
the parameter server to aggregate gradients received from workers, rather than using the vulnerable
averaging of gradients. Such a GAR e.g., Krum Blanchard et al. (2017), Median Xie et al. (2018a)
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is statistically proven to guarantee convergence of the learning processes even in the presence of a
minority of Byzantine workers, under some assumptions on the correct workers.
GuanYu El-Mhamdi et al. (2019) is, so far, the only proposal that solves the total1 Byzantine ML
problem. GuanYu uses a GAR, e.g., Bulyan El Mhamdi et al. (2018) for aggregating workers’ gra-
dients and Median Xie et al. (2018a) for aggregating models received from servers. Since it uses a
GAR (i.e., Median) for aggregating models, it requires workers to communicate with a majority of
servers in each iteration. Moreover, GuanYu assumes network asynchrony, namely that there is no
bound on communication delays. But this comes with a cost: First, it requires three communication
rounds, instead of two in the vanilla case, and it requires an assumption on the maximum distance
between parameter vectors, i.e., models at correct servers, which might be hard to obtain in certain
cases. Also, GuanYu requires a large number of compute nodes and server replicas to work, as
one cannot differentiate between a Byzantine machine and a slow one in such network Fischer et al.
(1985).
Having a synchronous network is common in practice for many distributed environments Hsieh et al.
(2017); Zhang et al. (2017) as practitioners can usually predict a conservative upper bound on the
network delays. Assuming network synchrony allows tolerating Byzantine failures using the stan-
dard solutions of state machine replication (SMR), e.g., Lamport et al. (2001). But SMR in the ML
context raises a few concerns: First, SMR requires multiple communication rounds per iteration
for agreement on the current state of the model and the updating step. Given the typical sizes of
models nowadays, the overhead of communication rounds is big enough to hide the effectiveness
of distributing the learning task Hsieh et al. (2017); Ivkin et al. (2019). Second, SMR requires repli-
cated workers that use the same data batch Chen et al. (2018). This reveals problematic in the case
of using private data that cannot be shared with others Shokri & Shmatikov (2015).
In this paper, we present LIUBEI, a total Byzantine–tolerant ML algorithm that does not trust any
individual component, while almost not adding any communication overhead, compared to standard
non–Byzantine deployments. LIUBEI introduces a novel mechanism that filters out replies from
Byzantine servers without requiring to communicate with all servers. Moreover, LIUBEI introduces
a novel protocol to reduce the number of communication rounds. Essentially, LIUBEI operates
in two phases: scatter and gather. In the scatter phase, servers work independently and do not
communicate with each other. In the gather phase, correct servers communicate to bring their view
of models back close to each other. The number of gather steps is usually very small and hence,
their overhead is insignificant. We prove that LIUBEI tolerates Byzantine failures and guarantees
learning convergence.
LIUBEI uses a GAR to aggregate workers’ gradients and hence, tolerates Byzantine gradients. Toler-
ating Byzantine servers relies on our filtering technique and the scatter/gather protocol; both assume
network synchrony. In each iteration in the scatter phase, each worker pulls the updated model from
only one server and then uses two filters to check the legitimacy of such a model: the Lipschitz
filter and the models filter. On the one hand, the Lipschitz filter checks the growth of the model
with respect to its gradient. A Lipschitz value is computed for a received model, which is then com-
pared to Lipschitz values of other correct models. On the other hand, the models filter bounds the
difference between models in two consecutive rounds. Based on the guarantees given by the used
GAR, a worker can speculatively compute an updated model that should be close to the received
model. Bounding the difference between both models allows workers to suspect whether a received
model is Byzantine or not. After T scatter iterations, LIUBEI does one gather step with the goal of
bringing the models on correct servers back close to each other. Hence, LIUBEI does not require an
assumption on the maximum distance between two correct models, as in GuanYu El-Mhamdi et al.
(2019).
We implement LIUBEI over TensorFlow to show its performance on typical workloads. We
show that LIUBEI can tolerate both Byzantine servers and workers while guaranteeing conver-
gence. We also show that LIUBEI can achieve the same performance as GuanYu, with 5%
accuracy loss compared to vanilla TensorFlow. We quantify LIUBEI overhead, compared to
vanilla TensorFlow, to around 24% and with a throughput gain of 70% compared to GuanYu.
Our source code is available Anonymous (2019). The passphrase for decrypting the code is:
<JFZ2a+}QcDfDw4uM]LSWSrtt$x;}7 Rj.y3KfmF .
1We use the term total Byzantine resilience to denote resilience against both workers and parameter servers.
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2 MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
2.1 BYZANTINE MACHINE LEARNING
The Byzantine problem was first introduced in the context of distributed services Lamport et al.
(1982) in which a minority of the distributed system components could behave arbitrarily. Such a
behavior could be the result of software bugs, hardware defects, message omissions, or even hacked
machines. Similarly, the Byzantine failure in a distributed ML system occurs when one of the
components in such a system behaves arbitrarily, i.e., not following the algorithm. For example, a
Byzantine machine can send a biased estimate of a gradient to another machine, which leads to a
corrupted learning model accordingly or even learning divergence Baruch et al. (2019). Byzantine
failures also abstract the data poisoning problem Biggio & Laskov (2012), which happens when a
machine owns maliciously labeled data (i.e., misleading data); this may result in learning a corrupted
model especially–crafted by the adversary. If the learning is centralized in one machine (as with the
standard parameter server architecture Li et al. (2013)), things can go worse if such a machine is
Byzantine as in this case, the adversary (which hacked such a machine) can write whatever it wants
to the final model, making the learning process almost useless. Such behavior should be tolerated as
ML is nowadays used in mission–critical applications.
2.2 SYSTEM MODEL
Parameter 
Server
Worker
Network
Byzantine
Figure 1: A setup with 7 workers (3 are Byzan-
tine) and 4 servers (1 is Byzantine). Byzantine
machines form together a single adversarial entity,
where they communicate over their own covert
network.
We consider the standard parameter server ar-
chitecture Li et al. (2013), where a logically
centralized server holds the learning parame-
ters, and workers do the gradient computation
task. In each learning step, workers pull the lat-
est version of the learning model from the pa-
rameter server and then, towards the end of the
iteration, the parameter server aggregates the
gradients computed by workers and updates the
model. We assume synchronous training: both
the parameter server and workers synchronize
their iteration number. We also assume a syn-
chronous communication model and therefore,
we assume an upper bound on communication
and computation delays. Thus, all machines ex-
pect a response from other machines within this
bound, and non–respondingmachines can be safely flagged crashing.
Unlike most of the existing work in Byzantine ML literature, we do not assume a trusted parameter
server. We replicate the parameter server on nps machines, among which up to fps machines could
be Byzantine, i.e., behave arbitrarily, with nps ≥ 3fps+1. In addition, we assume that up to fw out
of nw workers could be also Byzantine with nw ≥ 2fw + 1. Figure 1 depicts such a setup.
The goal of the Byzantine nodes, be they workers or servers, is to impair the learning, by making it
converge to a state different from the one that would have been obtained if no adversary had stymied
the learning process. Byzantine nodes can cooperate to achieve this goal. We assume these nodes
have unbounded computation power and arbitrarily fast communication channels (covert network
in Figure 1). We also assume these nodes have access to the full training dataset and can overhear
gradients sent by the correct workers. We assume that honest nodes can authenticate the source of a
message so as to prevent spoofing and Sybil attacks Castro et al. (1999).
We follow the usual assumptions in the Byzantine ML literature Chen et al. (2018); Blanchard et al.
(2017); El Mhamdi et al. (2018) (see supplementary material, Section 3.1). We assume that the
training data is identically and independently distributed (iid) on workers Lee et al. (2014) so that
they can compute, at step t ∈ N, an unbiased estimate (gt) of the true gradient ∇L (θ) (where θ
represents the learning model of size d) with a sufficiently low variance.
3
3 LIUBEI
In this section, we describe LIUBEI algorithm. First, we describe howwe tolerate Byzantine workers
and servers, explaining our filtering technique and providing an intuition on why it works. Then, we
present the training loop of both servers and workers.
3.1 TOTAL BYZANTINE RESILIENCE
Byzantine workers. Tolerating Byzantine workers is well-studied in the ML literature. Usually, the
parameter server uses a statistically robust gradient aggregation rule (GAR), e.g., Xie et al. (2018a);
El Mhamdi et al. (2018) that ensures having a correct gradient despite the presence of a minority of
Byzantine gradients. LIUBEI can use any existing synchronous GAR that follows the robustness
definition of Blanchard et al. (2017), which is also formally given in the supplementary material,
Section 1.1. We choose MDA Rousseeuw (1985) for our algorithm as it gives practical resilience
guarantees (supplementary material, Section 4) with a reasonable overhead as confirmed in our
evaluation (Section 4). MDA requires nw ≥ 2fw + 1.
Byzantine servers. Tolerating Byzantine servers using robust aggregation requires communication
with all servers in each round, which results in a big communication overhead. We follow another
route: We let each worker pull only one model from any of the server replicas and then checks
if the pulled model is suspicious or not. A worker does this check by applying two filters on the
pulled model (the Lipschitz filter and the models filter), which we describe below. If the model is
suspicious, the worker discards it and pulls a new model from another parameter server. Thus, the
maximum number of models that can be pulled by a worker in one iteration is fps + 1.
Lipschitz filter. Based on the standard Lipschitz continuity of the loss function assumption Bottou
(1998); Blanchard et al. (2017), previous work uses empirical estimations for the Lipschitz coeffi-
cient to filter out gradients (from Byzantine workers) in asynchronous learning Damaskinos et al.
(2018). We use a similar idea, yet to filter out models (on the workers’ side) from Byzantine servers.
The filter works as follows: Assume a worker j that owns a model θ
(j)
t and a gradient it computed
g
(j)
t based on that model at some iteration t. A correct server i should include g
(j)
t while updating its
model θ
(i)
t , given network synchrony. The worker then does two steps in parallel: (1) estimates the
updated model locally based on its own gradient: θ
(j(l))
t+1 and (2) pulls a model θ
(i)
t+1 from a parameter
server i. If server i is correct then, the growth of the pulled model θ
(i)
t+1 (with respect to gradients)
should be close to that of the estimated local model θ
(j(l))
t+1 , based on the guarantees given by the
used GAR. Such a growth rate is encapsulated in the Lipschitz coefficient. If the pulled model is cor-
rect then, the worker expects that the Lipschitz coefficient computed based on that model is close to
those of the other correct models received before by the worker. Concretely, a worker computes an
empirical estimation of the Lipschitz coefficient k =
∥
∥
∥g
(j)
t+1 − g
(j)
t
∥
∥
∥/
∥
∥
∥θ
(j(l))
t+1 − θ
(j)
t
∥
∥
∥ and then, ensures
that it follows the condition k ≤ Kp , quantilenps−fps
nps
{K}, where K is the list of all previous
Lipschitz coefficients k (i.e., with tprev < t).
Note that such a filtering technique requires nps > 3fps as Byzantine machines can craft models
with Lipschitz coefficients that are deliberately placed in the first 2fps places of the set K . Hence,
the tradeoff here is between the communication overhead and the required number of parameter
server replicas: one can use robust aggregation of models, which requires only nps > 2fps, yet
requires communicating with all servers in each round. In our design, we strive for reducing the
communication overhead as much as possible, given communication is the bottleneck Zhang et al.
(2017); Hsieh et al. (2017).
Models filter. Although the Lipschitz filter can bound the model growth with respect to gradi-
ents, a server can trick this filter by sending a well-crafted model that is arbitrarily far from the
other correct models. To overcome this problem, LIUBEI uses another filter, which we call mod-
els filter, to bound the distance between models in any two successive iterations. We assume
all correct machines initialize models with the same state. Building upon the guarantees given
by the used GAR, at iteration t, a worker can estimate an upper bound on the distance between
two successive states of a correct model. Mathematically, the distance between a local estimate
of a model θ
(j(l))
t+1 and a pulled model θ
(i)
t+1 is upper–bounded as follows:
∥∥∥θ(j(l))t+1 − θ(i)t+1∥∥∥ <
4
γT ·(t mod T )
∥∥gT ·(t mod T )∥∥((3T + 2)(nw − fw)/4fw+2((t−1) mod T )), with T = 1/3lγ1, where
l is the Lipschitz coefficient and γt is the learning rate at iteration t. Such a bound is also based on
the scatter/gather scheme we are using. The details of deriving this term is in the supplementary
material, Section 3.4.2.
3.2 ALGORITHM
LIUBEI’s algorithm operates in two phases: scatter and gather. One gather step is executed every
T iterations (line 8 to 11 in Algorithms 1 and 2); we call the whole T iterations a scatter step.
Algorithms 1 and 2 depict the training loop applied by workers and servers respectively. As an
initialization step, all machines in the network, be they workers or servers, initialize the model
with the same random values, i.e., using the same seed. Empirical results show that this step is
crucial in achieving high accuracy. Moreover, each worker j chooses some random integer rj with
1 ≤ rj ≤ nps. Then each worker does a backpropagation step to compute its gradient estimate at
the initial model. The subsequent steps t ∈ N work as follows.
Algorithm 1Worker Algorithm
1: Calculate the value of T and a value for seed
2: model← init model(seed)
3: r← random int(1,nps)
4: t← 0
5: grad← model.backprop()
6: repeat
7: local model← apply grad(model,grad)
8: if t mod T = 0 then
9: models← read models()
10: model←MeaMed(models)
11: else
12: i← 0
13: repeat
14: new model← read model(
(r + t+ i) mod nps)
15: new grad← new model.backprop()
16: i← i+ 1
17: until pass filters(new model)
18: model← new model
19: grad← new grad
20: end if
21: t← t+ 1
22: until t > num iterations
The algorithm starts with a scatter step, which includes
doing a few iterations. In each iteration, each parameter
server i pulls gradients gt from allworkers and aggregates
them usingMDA, computing g
(i)
agg. Then, each server uses
its own computed g
(i)
agg to update the model. While param-
eter servers are doing such computation, each worker j
does a speculative step by computing a local view of the
updated model using its local computed gradient and its
latest local model.
Then, each worker j pulls one parameter vector from
server iwhere, i = (rj+t+1) mod nps. Such a worker
does a backpropagation step, computing the new gradient
based on the pulled model. Based on this computation
and the local estimate of the updated model, the worker
applies the Lipschitz filter and the models filter to check
the legitimacy of the pulled model. If the model fails to
pass the filters, the worker j pulls a new model from the
parameter server i, where i = (rj + t + 2) mod nps.
This process is repeated until a pulled model passes both
filters.
To bound the drifts between parameter vectors at correct
servers, every T iterations, a global gather step is exe-
cuted on both servers and workers sides: Each server i
sends to all other servers its current view of the model θ
(i)
t .
After gathering models from all servers, each server i ag-
gregates the received models usingMean Around Median
(MeaMed)Xie et al. (2018a), computing θ
(i(agg))
t . Then,
each worker j pulls such models θ
(i(agg))
t from all servers
and aggregates them usingMeaMed, before starting a new scatter step.
The interplay between using MDA to tolerate Byzantine workers and filters to tolerate Byzantine
servers results in a convergence rate ofO(
√
(nw − fw)/nwT 2). The formal proof of LIUBEI’s Byzan-
tine resilience is provided in the supplementary material (Section 3).
4 IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
4.1 IMPLEMENTATION
We use TensorFlow Abadi et al. (2016), a popular ML framework, as an underlying system for our
implementation of LIUBEI. We use it only as a local library to compute gradients (on the workers’
side) and update the model (on the parameter server side). In this sense, we do not rely on the
shared graph design followed by TensorFlow. Yet, we allow each machine in the network, be it a
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server or a worker, to build its own independent graph. This gives better control over communication
and disallows access of Byzantine machines to correct machines’ memory Damaskinos et al. (2019).
Moreover, this modular design allows LIUBEI to be integrated easily with other ML frameworks,
e.g., PyTorch Paszke et al. (2017).
Algorithm 2 Parameter Server Algorithm
1: Calculate the value of T and a value for seed
2: model← init model(seed)
3: t← 0
4: repeat
5: grads← read gradients()
6: grad←MDA(grads)
7: model.update(grad)
8: if t mod T = 0 then
9: model← read models()
10: model←MeaMed(models)
11: end if
12: t← t+ 1
13: until t > num iterations
As a consequence of our design, we build our own com-
munication abstractions. We use gRPC for communica-
tion and Protocol Buffers for serializing and deserializing
data. Each machine in the network creates a gRPC server
that serves requests coming from other machines. Such a
request could be either asking for a gradient (usually from
a server) or asking for an updated model (either from a
worker or a server). We parallelize requests to multiple
machines (for example when a server asks for gradients
from all workers).
4.2 SETUP
Baselines. We compare LIUBEI to two base-
lines: TensorFlow Abadi et al. (2016) and
GuanYu El-Mhamdi et al. (2019). The first baseline
shows the performance of training using a non–Byzantine
resilient distributed framework and hence, comparing
LIUBEI to it quantifies the cost of Byzantine resilience.
GuanYu is (so far) the only algorithm that tolerates both
Byzantine servers and workers. Comparing LIUBEI to
GuanYu highlights the performance gain achieved by our algorithm.
Metrics. We use two standard metrics for evaluating LIUBEI: Accuracy and Throughput. Accu-
racy denotes the fraction of correct answers a model gives (correct classifications) among all its
answers, using the test set. We show the progress of accuracy with the number of iterations and time.
Throughput measures the number of updates the system, i.e., the parameter server does per second.
Testbed. Our experimental platform is Grid5000 Grid5000 (2019). We employ nodes, each having
2 CPUs (Intel Xeon E5-2630 v4) with 10 cores, 256 GiB RAM and 2×10 Gbps Ethernet. Unless
otherwise stated, we employ 20 compute nodes (workers), out of them (up to) 8 nodes could be
Byzantine. In the case of vanilla TensorFlow deployment, we use only 1 machine as a parameter
server. Otherwise, we employ 4 machines for LIUBEI deployment and 5 machines for GuanYu
deployment; these numbers are to tolerate at most 1 Byzantine server, based on the requirements of
each algorithm.
Table 1: Models used to evaluate LIUBEI.
Model # parameters Size (MB)
MNIST CNN 79510 0.3
CifarNet 1756426 6.7
Inception 5602874 21.4
ResNet-50 23539850 89.8
ResNet-200 62697610 239.2
Dataset and Model. We consider the
image classification task due to its wide
adoption as a benchmark for distributed ML
systems, e.g., Chilimbi et al. (2014). We
use MNIST Lecunn (1998) and CIFAR-
10 Krizhevsky (2009) datasets. MNIST is a
dataset of handwritten digits. It has 70,000
28 × 28 images in 10 classes. CIFAR-
10 is a widely–used dataset in image clas-
sification Srivastava et al. (2014); Zhang et al.
(2017). It consists of 60,000 32 × 32 colour
images in 10 classes.
We employ different models with different sizes ranging from simple models like small convolu-
tional neural network (CNN) for MNIST, training a few thousands of parameters to big models like
ResNet-200 with around 63M parameters. All models are listed in Table 1.
4.3 RESULTS
We show here the key results of the evaluation of LIUBEI. First, we show the progress of accuracy
over training iterations and time (i.e., convergence) and then, we discuss the throughput of LIUBEI
compared to GuanYuEl-Mhamdi et al. (2019); both sets of experiments are done in a Byzantine–free
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environment. Then, we show the performance of LIUBEI in a Byzantine environment, i.e., under a
recent attack. Finally, we describe the effect of changing the value of T on the filters’ performance
and convergence.
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Figure 2: Convergence in a non-Byzantine environment.
Convergence. Figure 2 shows the convergenceof all experimented systems with both time and train-
ing iterations. We experimentwith two batch sizes and two values for declared Byzantine servers and
workers (only for the Byzantine–tolerant deployments). Figure 2a shows that all deployments have
almost the same convergence, with a slight loss in final accuracy for the Byzantine–tolerant deploy-
ments, which we quantify to around 5%. Such a loss is emphasized with the smaller batch size (Fig-
ure 2c). This accuracy loss is admitted in previous work Xie et al. (2018a); El-Mhamdi et al. (2019)
and inherits from using statistical methods (basically, GARs) for Byzantine resilience. Such GARs
ensure convergence only to a ball around the optimal solution, i.e., local minimum Blanchard et al.
(2017); El Mhamdi et al. (2018). As LIUBEI builds on these GARs, we expect it to achieve an accu-
racy similar to that achieved by such GARs. Moreover, the figures confirm that using a higher batch
size gives a better performance for both LIUBEI and GuanYu. Figures 2a and 2c show that LIUBEI
achieves the same convergence behavior as GuanYu.
The cost of Byzantine resilience is more clear when convergence is observed over time (Figure 2b),
especially with the lower batch size (Figure 2d). Using a bigger batch size helps the Byzantine–
tolerant systems achieve a performance close to vanilla TensorFlow. We quantify the overhead of
LIUBEI compared to vanilla TensorFlow to around 24% and the performance gain of LIUBEI com-
pared to GuanYu by around 70%. We analyze this overhead with more scenarios later on in the
section. We draw two main observations from these figures: First, unlike with GuanYu, changing
the number of declared Byzantine machines does not affect the progress of accuracywhile deploying
LIUBEI. This is because servers and workers in LIUBEI deployments always wait for replies from
all machines, regardless of the number of Byzantine machines (unlike in GuanYu, where the num-
ber of expected replies depends on the number of Byzantine machines). Second, LIUBEI always
outperforms GuanYu, especially with non–zero values for declared Byzantine servers and workers.
Such a result is expected as LIUBEI uses less number of communication rounds and less num-
ber of messages per round compared to GuanYu. Given that distributed ML systems are network–
bound Hsieh et al. (2017); Zhang et al. (2017), reducing the communication overhead significantly
boosts the performance and the scalability of such systems.
Throughput. We do the same experiment again, yet with different state–of–the–art models so
as to quantify the throughput gain of LIUBEI compared to GuanYu. Figure 3 shows the through-
put of LIUBEI divided by the throughput of GuanYu in each case. For the current version of our
implementation, we use CPUs for computation; we expect that using GPUs will emphasize more
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the effectiveness of our LIUBEI protocol as the communication overhead is generally highlighted
more with GPUs. From this figure, we see that LIUBEI outperforms GuanYu in all cases, where the
performance gain is emphasized more with large models. This is expected because the main advan-
tage of LIUBEI is to decrease the number of communication messages, where bigger messages are
transmitted with bigger models.
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Figure 3: Throughput gain
of LIUBEI compared to
GuanYu El-Mhamdi et al. (2019).
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Figure 4: Convergence in the presence
of Byzantine workers.
Byzantine workers. We study here the perfor-
mance of LIUBEI in the presence of Byzantine work-
ers. Simple misbehavior like message drops, unrespon-
sive machines or reversed gradients are well-studied and
have been shown to be tolerated by Byzantine–resilient
GARs Xie et al. (2018a); El-Mhamdi et al. (2019), which
LIUBEI also uses. Thus, here we focus on a more
recent attack that is coined as A little is enough at-
tack Baruch et al. (2019). Such an attack states that
changing each dimension in gradients of Byzantine ma-
chines, even by a very small value, can trick some of
Byzantine–resilient GARs like Blanchard et al. (2017);
El Mhamdi et al. (2018).
We apply this attack to multiple deployments of LIUBEI.
In each scenario, we apply the strongest possible change
in gradients’ coordinates so as to hamper the convergence
the most. We study the effect of this attack on the con-
vergence of LIUBEI with both the ratio of Byzantine ma-
chines to the total number of machines (Figure 4a) and
the batch size (Figure 4b). We use the deployment with
no declared Byzantine behavior (that is presented in Fig-
ure 2a) as a baseline in this experiment.
Figure 4a shows that the effect of the attack starts to ap-
pear clearly when the number of Byzantine nodes is a sig-
nificant fraction (more than 20%) of the total number of
nodes. This is intuitive as the attack tries to increase the
variance between the submitted gradients to the parameter servers and hence, increases the ball
(around the local minimum) to which the used GAR converges (see e.g. Blanchard et al. (2017);
El Mhamdi et al. (2018) for a theoretical analysis of the interplay between the variance and the
Byzantine resilience). Stretching the number of Byzantine machines to the maximum allowed
(fw = 8) downgrades the accuracy to around 40% (compared to 67% in “No Attack” case). The
main reason for this is that the assumption on the variance between gradients required byMDA (the
used GAR in this deployment) is not satisfied. We discuss this issue in details in the supplementary
material (Section 4).
Increasing the batch size not only improves the accuracy per training iteration but also the robustness
of LIUBEI (by narrowing down the radius of the ball around the convergence point, where the model
will fluctuate as proven in Blanchard et al. (2017); El Mhamdi et al. (2018)). Figure 4b fixes the
ratio of fw to nw to the biggest allowed value to see the effect of using a bigger batch size on the
convergence behavior. This figure confirms that increasing the batch size increases the robustness
of LIUBEI. Moreover, based on our experiments, setting 25% of nodes to be Byzantine while using
a batch size of (up to) 256 does not experimentally satisfy the assumption on the variance of MDA
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in this deployment, which leads to a lower accuracy after convergence (see supplementary material,
Section 4).
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Figure 5: Convergence in the presence
of a Byzantine server.
Byzantine servers. Figure 5 shows the performance of
LIUBEI in the presence of 1 Byzantine server out of a
total of 4 servers. We experimented with 4 Byzantine
behavior: 1. Reversed, in which the server sends a cor-
rect model multiplied by a negative number, 2. Partial
Drop, in which the server randomly chooses 10% of the
weights and set them to zero (this simulates using unreli-
able transport protocol in the communication layer, which
was proven beneficial, e.g., Damaskinos et al. (2019)), 3.
Random, in which the server replaces the learned weights
by random numbers, and 4. LIE, an attack inspired from
the little is enough attack Baruch et al. (2019), in which
the server multiplies each of the individual weights by a
small number z, where |z − 1| < δ with δ very close to zero; z = 1.035 in our experiments. Such
a figure shows that LIUBEI can tolerate the experimented Byzantine behavior and that the learning
converges to the same accuracy observed before in Figure 2a. We noted that both filters together do
not pass any false positives, i.e., the models submitted from the Byzantine server never pass both
filters (although could trick one filter individually).
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Figure 6: The effect of changing T on
performance.
Effect of changing T . The value of T denotes the num-
ber of iterations done in one scatter step (i.e., before ex-
ecuting one gather step). Figure 6 shows the effect of
changing the value of T on convergence with both time
and model updates in a Byzantine-free environment. Fig-
ure 6a shows that the value of T almost does not have any
effect on the convergence w.r.t. the model updates. This
happens because models on correct servers almost do not
drift from each other (as all the servers are correct). In-
terestingly, Figure 6b shows that using a higher value for
T helps converge faster. This is because increasing T de-
creases the communication overhead, achieving faster up-
dates and higher throughput. However, it is important to
note that as the value of T increases, the expected drifts
between models on correct servers increases, and it be-
comes easier for the Byzantine server to trick the work-
ers.
Figure 7 shows the ratio of false negatives (i.e., the num-
ber of falsely-rejected correct models by filters on the
workers) to the total number of submitted models, with
different values for T . Although we declare fps = 1, we
do not employ any Byzantine behavior in this experiment.
We observe the number of rejected models on workers af-
ter 500 learning iterations. In general, the ratio of false
negatives never exceeds 1% in this experiment, and it is
almost stable with increasing T . Note that 333 is the maximum value allowed for T in this setup (to
follow the safety rules of LIUBEI). With T = 1, the false negatives are always zero, simply because
the filters do not work in this setup (i.e., the gather step is executed in every iteration). Such a figure
shows that our filtering mechanism is effective in not producing many false negatives and hence, do
not waste communication rounds (when a model is rejected, the worker asks for another model from
a different server).
5 RELATED WORK
The closest approach to ours is GuanYu El-Mhamdi et al. (2019), which tolerates Byzantine work-
ers and servers, considering however an asynchronous network. GuanYu uses a GAR to tolerate
Byzantine workers and Median Xie et al. (2018a) twice in a row in each iteration at both workers
and parameter servers to tolerate Byzantine servers. We note two limitations in this work. First,
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GuanYu’s design induces an overhead both in computation and communication: the algorithm re-
quires three communication rounds and applies aggregation rules three times in each iteration. In
addition, it requires more compute nodes than the vanilla case to tolerate network asynchrony. Such
an overhead limits scalability for large–scale applications that use models with millions of parame-
ters. Second, for GuanYu to work, the authors assume that the difference between models on correct
parameter servers is always bounded; this cannot be fulfilled in some cases. We address these two
problems by using a new filtering mechanism instead of models aggregation and by employing a
gather step every few iterations accordingly.
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Figure 7: False negative percentagewith
different values of T .
Several proposals tolerate only Byzantine workers
in synchronous/asynchronous network and syn-
chronous/asynchronous learning, all assuming a
single correct parameter server. Xie et al. (2018a)
proposed three Median-based aggregation rules
that can resist both Byzantine and Dimensional
attacks. Krum Blanchard et al. (2017) and Multi-
Krum Damaskinos et al. (2019) use a distance-based
algorithm to filter out the Byzantine inputs and average
the correct ones. Bulyan El Mhamdi et al. (2018) pro-
poses a meta-algorithm that guarantees a strong Byzan-
tine resilience, i.e., resist a strong adversary that can
fool the aforementioned algorithms. Draco Chen et al.
(2018) uses coding schemes and redundant gradient computation for Byzantine resilience, where
Detox Rajput et al. (2019) combines coding schemes with robust aggregation for better resilience
and overhead guarantees. Kardam Damaskinos et al. (2018) uses filtering techniques to filter out
Byzantine workers in asynchronous learning setup.
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Summary. This paper proposed LIUBEI, a robust Machine Learning (ML) algorithm that does
not trust any individual component in the network almost without adding communication rounds
compared to vanilla distributed ML systems. LIUBEI relies on the server/worker architecture and
assumes network synchrony. LIUBEI introduces a novel filtering mechanism used by workers to
check whether a pulled model (from a parameter server) is suspicious or not, without requiring to
pull models from all servers. LIUBEI also introduces a novel protocol, scatter/gather, to reduce the
communication overhead. We theoretically prove that LIUBEI tolerates Byzantine servers and work-
ers and ensures convergence. Our experiments with a TensorFlow–based implementation show that
LIUBEI’s overhead, in terms of convergence, is around 24% compared to vanilla TensorFlow, where
its throughput gain is around 70% compared to a state–of–the–art solution that tolerates Byzantine
workers and servers in asynchronous networks.
Open question. The relation between the frequency of applying the gather step and the variance
between models on correct servers is data–dependent and model–dependent. In our analysis, we
provide safety guarantees on this relation that will always ensure Byzantine resilience and conver-
gence. However, we believe that in some cases applying the gather step more frequently may lead
to a noticeable improvement in the convergence speed as it decreases the variance. The trade-off
between this gain and the overhead of communication (to gather) remains a data-dependent and
model-dependent question that is out of the scope of this work.
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Fast Machine Learning with
Byzantine Workers and Servers
Supplementary Material
QUICK NOTE
We give here the convergence proof of LIUBEI along with its resilience guarantees. LIUBEI ad-
dresses the total Byzantine resilience problem in distributedMachine Learning (ML) context (follow-
ing the parameter server architecture Li et al. (2013)) where, both workers and servers could behave
arbitrarily. LIUBEI assumes the network to be synchronous, i.e., there is an upper bound (not nec-
essarily known) on the computation and communication delay. LIUBEI uses a Byzantine–resilient
gradient aggregation rule (GAR) to tolerate Byzantine workers, which is Minimum–Diameter Av-
eraging Rousseeuw (1985) (or in short MDA). Such a GAR can be safely replaced with any other
GAR that gives similar guarantees given by the used GAR such as Krum Blanchard et al. (2017) or
Median Xie et al. (2018a). The main goal of LIUBEI is to reduce communication overhead as much
as possible, while guaranteeing resilience against Byzantine workers and servers. This is mainly
achieved by our novel filtering technique and our scatter/gather protocol.
Note about the name. Lui Bei was the warlord of Guan Yu, the general whose name is given to
the first algorithm to tolerate both Byzantine workers and servers. We show that LIUBEI performs
better than GuanYu.
1 PRELIMINARY MATERIAL
1.1 ROBUST AGGREGATION
Robust aggregation of gradients is the key for Byzantine workers’ resilience. To this end, gradi-
ents are processed by a gradient aggregation rule (GAR), which purpose is to ensure that output of
aggregation is as close as possible to the real gradient of the loss function.
In the general theory of stochastic gradient descent (SGD) convergence, a typical validity assumption
is that the gradient estimator is unbiased Bottou (1998). The role of a GAR is to ensure a relaxed
version of this assumption in order to accommodate for the presence of malicious workers (whose
gradients are potentially biased).
Definition 1 gives such a relaxation, which we adapt from Blanchard et al. (2017); El Mhamdi et al.
(2018) and which was used as a standard for Byzantine resilience in, e.g. Xie et al. (2018b;c;a).
Definition 1. Let α ≤ 0 < π/2 be any angular value and 0 ≤ f ≤ n with n the total number of
input vectors to the GAR and f the maximum number of Byzantine vectors. Let g be an unbiased
estimate of the true gradientG, i.e., EG = g.
A GAR (which output noted as F ) is robust (said to be (α, f)–Byzanitne resilient) if
〈EF , g〉 ≥ (1− sinα). ‖g‖
2
> 0
LIUBEI uses two GARs: Minimum–Diameter Averaging El Mhamdi et al. (2018) andMean Around
Median Xie et al. (2018a).
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1.2 Minimum–Diameter Averaging (MDA)
MDA is a gradient aggregation rule (GAR) that ensures resilience against a minority of Byzantine in-
put gradients. Mathematically, this function was introduced in Rousseeuw (1985) and its Byzantine
resilience proof was given in El Mhamdi et al. (2018). MDA satisfies the (α, f) Byzantine resilience
guarantees2 introduced in Blanchard et al. (2017). Formally, let X be the set of input gradients (all
follow the same distribution), out of them f are Byzantine, and y be the output of the Byzantine
resilient GAR. Then, the following properties hold:
1. E y is in the same half–space as EX .
2. the first 4 statistical moments of y are bounded above by a linear combination of the first 4
statistical moments of x ∼ X .
Such conditions are sufficient to show that the output of this GAR guarantees convergence of the
learning procedure. More formally, these conditions enable the GAR to have a proof that follows
from the global confinement proof of Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) Bottou (1998).
In order to work,MDA assumes the following (as any other GAR):
∃κ∈ ]1,+∞[ , ∀(i, t, θ)∈ [1 .. n−f ]×N×Rd, κ
2f
n− f
√
E
(∥∥∥g(i)t − Eg(i)t ∥∥∥2) ≤ ‖∇L (θ)‖ , (1)
where θ is the model state at the training iteration t, n is the total number of input gradients, f is
the maximum number of Byzantine gradients, gt is an unbiased estimate of the gradient at iteration
t, and L is the loss function.
The MDA function works as follows: Consider that the total number of gradients is n and the max-
imum number of Byzantine gradients is f with n ≥ 2f + 1. MDA enumerates all subsets of size
n− f from the input gradients and finds the subset with the minimum diameter among all subsets of
this size, i.e., n− f . The diameter of a subset is defined as the maximum distance between any two
elements of this subset. The output of theMDA function is the average of gradients in such a subset.
More formally, theMDA function is defined as follows El Mhamdi et al. (2018):
Let (g1 . . . gn) ∈
(
R
d
)n
, and X , { g1 . . . gn } the set containing all the input gradients.
Let R , {Q | Q ⊂ X , |Q| = n− f } the set of all the subsets of X with a cardinality of n − f ,
and let S , argmin
Q∈R
(
max
(gi,gj)∈Q2
(‖gi − gj‖)
)
.
Then, the aggregated gradient is given byMDA (g1 . . . gn) ,
1
n−f
∑
g∈S
g.
1.3 Mean Around Median (MeaMed)
The MeaMed function is a fairly intuitive function to remove outliers from an input set. As an
aggregation rule, MeaMed was proven to be (α, f) Byzantine resilient in Xie et al. (2018a). Even
more than that,MeaMed can resist dimensional attacks, i.e., dimensional (α, f) Byzantine resilient.
In this paper, we apply MeaMed to models, rather than gradients not only to exclude Byzantine
models but also to bring models on correct servers close to each other.
MeaMed works as follows: For each dimension (in d), MeaMed finds the median value among all
input models and then averages the closest n − f − 1 values to this value, along with the median
value. Formally, the MeaMed function is defined as follows:
Let X be the set of input models of size n, where the maximum number of Byzantine models is f
with n ≥ 2f + 1.
Let the output of MeaMed be ρ, with ρj is the dimension/coordinate j ∈ [1 . . . d] in the output
model.
Letmj be the median value of all values in dimension j at all input models θ in X .
2Basically, any GAR that satisfies such a form of resilience Blanchard et al. (2017); El Mhamdi et al. (2018);
Xie et al. (2018a) can be used with LIUBEI;MDA is just an instance.
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Then, ρj ,
1
n−f
∑
θj∈Sj
θj , where Sj is the set of closest values to mj in dimension j among all
inputs, includingmj , i.e., |Sj | = n− f .
2 LIUBEI’S ALGORITHM
2.1 NOTATIONS
Let (nw, nps, fw, fps, d) ∈ N
5, each representing:
• nps ≥ 3fps + 1 the total number of parameter servers, among which fps are Byzantine
• nw ≥ 2fw + 1 the total number of workers, among which fw are Byzantine
• d the dimension of the parameter space Rd
Let (without loss of generality):
• [1 .. nps − fps] be indexes of correct parameter servers
[nps − fps + 1 .. nps] be indexes of Byzantine parameter servers
• [1 .. nw − fw] be indexes of correct workers
[nw − fw + 1 .. nw] be indexes of Byzantine workers
Let θ
(i)
t be a notation for the parameter vector (i.e., model) at parameter server i ∈ [1 .. nps − fps]
for step t ∈ N.
Let g
(i)
t be a notation for the gradient estimation at worker i ∈ [1 .. nw − fw] for step t ∈ N.
Let G
(i)
t be a notation for the gradient distribution at worker i ∈ [1 .. nw − fw] for step t ∈ N.
Let L be the loss function we aim to minimize, let ∇L (θ) be the real gradient of the loss function
at θ, and let ∇̂L (θ) be a stochastic estimation of the gradient, followingG, of L at θ.
Let γt be the learning rate at the learning iteration t ∈ N with the following specifications:
1. The sequence of learning rates γt is decreasing
3 with t, i.e., if ta > tb then, γta < γtb .
Thus, the initial learning rate γ0 is the largest value among learning rates used in subsequent
steps.
2. The sequence of learning rates γt satisfies
∑
t γt =∞ and
∑
t γt
2 <∞.
2.2 ALGORITHM
Initialization. Each correct parameter server i and worker j starts (at step t = 0) with the same
parameter vector:
∀i ∈ [1 .. nps − fps] , θ
(i)
0 , θ0
∀j ∈ [1 .. nw − fw] , θ
(j)
0 , θ0
Each correct worker j generates a random integer rj ∈ [1 .. nps] and does one backpropagation step
to compute g
(j)
0 at the initial model θ0.
Training loop. Each training step t ∈ N, the following sub-steps are executed sequentially (unless
otherwise stated).
1. Each parameter server i pulls gradients gt from all workers and then applies the MDA
function on the received gradients, computing the aggregated gradient g
(i)
agg. Then, each
server uses its own computed g
(i)
agg to update the model as follows: θ
(i)
t+1 = θ
(i)
t − γtg
(i)
agg.
2. While parameter servers are doing step 1, each worker j does a speculative step as follows:
a worker j calculates its local view to the updated model: θ
(j(l))
t+1 = θ
(j)
t − γtg
(j)
t .
3. Each worker j pulls one parameter vector θ
(i)
t+1 from server i where, i = (rj + t + 1)
mod nps.
4. Each worker j does the backpropagation step, computing g
(j)
t+1 at the pulled model θ
(i)
t+1.
3In fact, it is sufficient that the sequence is decreasing only once every T steps, with T = 1
3.l.γ1
where l is
the Lipschitz coefficient of assumption 5 (cf Section 3.1).
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5. Each worker j tests the legitimacy of the received model θ
(i)
t+1 using the Lipschitz criterion
(i.e., Lipschitz filter) and the difference on model norms (i.e., models filter) as follows.
First, a worker j calculates k, an empirical estimation of the Lipschitz coefficient, which is
defined as:
k =
∥∥∥g(j)t+1 − g(j)t ∥∥∥∥∥∥θ(j(l))t+1 − θ(j)t ∥∥∥
Then, the worker tests whether this value k lies in the non-Byzantine quantile of Lipschitz
coefficients: k ≤ Kp , quantilenps−fps
nps
{K} where, K is the list of all previous Lipschitz
coefficients k (i.e., with tprev < t). Second, the worker j computes the distance between
the local and the pulled (from server i) models as follows:
∥∥∥θ(j(l))t+1 − θ(i)t+1∥∥∥ and makes
sure that such a difference is < γT ·(t mod T )
∥∥gT ·(t mod T )∥∥( (3T+2)(nw−fw)4fw +2((t− 1)
mod T
))
, with T = 1/3lγ1, where l is the Lipschitz coefficient (assumption 5). Such a
difference is instructed by a correct execution of the MDA algorithm. If both conditions
are satisfied, the received model θ
(i)
t+1 is approved and the algorithm continues normally.
Otherwise, the parameter server i is suspected and its model is ignored; worker j continues
by repeating iteration t again from step 3.
6. To bound the drifts between parameter vectors at correct servers, each T = 1/3lγ1 steps, a
global gather step is executed on both servers and workers sides. This step is executed as
follows: Each server i sends to all other servers its current view of the model θ
(i)
t . After
gathering models from all servers, each server i aggregates such models with MeaMed,
computing θ
(i(agg))
t . Then, each worker j pulls the model θ
(i(agg))
t from all parameter
servers and aggregates the received models using MeaMed. Finally, each worker j uses
the aggregated model to compute the backpropagation step, and the algorithm continues
normally from step 1.
We call steps 1 through 5 scatter step and step 6 gather step. During scatter step(s) servers do not
communicate and hence, their views of the model deviate from each other. The goal of the gather
step is to bring back the models at the correct servers close to each other.
3 LIUBEI’S CONVERGENCE
In this section, we show that LIUBEI guarantees convergence and tolerates Byzantine workers and
servers. We first state the assumptions for LIUBEI to work and then dive into the proof, which is
shown step by step: First, we show that the result of execution ofMDA on two correct servers results
in models that are close to each other. Then, we show how we bound the distance between models
on correct servers throughout the learning procedure using the scatter/gather protocol. After that,
we explain our novel filtering mechanism and show why they can tolerate Byzantine servers. Finally,
we put everything together to show the convergence of LIUBEI.
3.1 ASSUMPTIONS
1. ∀t ∈ N, g
(1)
t . . . g
(nw−fw)
t are mutually independent.
2. ∃σ′ ∈ R+, ∀ (i, t) ∈ [1 .. nw − fw]× N, E
∥∥∥g(i)t − E g(i)t ∥∥∥ ≤ σ′.
3. L is positive, and 3–times differentiable with continuous derivatives.
4. ∀r ∈ [2 .. 4] , ∃ (Ar, Br) ∈ R
2, ∀ (i, t, θ) ∈ [1 .. nw − fw] × N × R
d, E
∥∥∥g(i)t ∥∥∥ ≤ Ar +
Br ‖θ‖
r
.
5. L is Lipschitz continuous, i.e. ∃l > 0, ∀ (x, y) ∈
(
R
d
)2
, ‖∇L (x)−∇L (y)‖ ≤
l ‖x− y‖.
6. ∃D ∈ R, ∀θ ∈ Rd, ‖θ‖
2
≥ D, ∃ (ε, β) ∈ R+ × [0, π/2− γ[ ,
‖∇L (θ)‖ ≥ ε, 〈θ,∇L (θ)〉 ≥ cos (β) ‖θ‖ ‖∇L (θ)‖.
17
Assumptions 1 to 5 (i.i.d, bounded variance, differentiability of the loss, bounded statistical mo-
ments, and Lipschitz continuity of the gradient) are the most common ones in classical SGD analy-
sis Bottou (1998); Bousquet & Bottou (2008).
Assumption 6 was first adapted from Bottou (1998) by Blanchard et al. (2017); El Mhamdi et al.
(2018); Damaskinos et al. (2018) to account for Byzantine resilience. It intuitively says that beyond
a certain horizon, the loss function is “steep enough” (lower bounded gradient) and “convex enough”
(lower bounded angle between the gradient and the parameter vector). The loss function does not
need to be convex, but adding regularization terms such as ‖θ‖2 ensures assumption 6, since close to
infinity, the regularization dominates the rest of the loss function and permits the gradient∇L(θ) to
point to the same half space as θ. The original assumption of Bottou (1998) is that 〈θ,∇L (θ)〉 > 0;
in Blanchard et al. (2017); El Mhamdi et al. (2018) it was argued that requiring this scalar product
to be strictly positive is the same as requiring the angle between θ and∇L (θ) to be lower bounded
by an acute angle (β < pi/2).
3.2 BOUNDED GRADIENT AGGREGATION ON CORRECT PARAMETER SERVERS
Consider two correct servers x and z, this section discusses the maximum difference between aggre-
gated gradients (usingMDA) on both servers at any step t ∈ N.
Let (d, fw) ∈ (N− {0})
2
and nw ≥ 2fw + 1. Let Hx be the set of indices of correct gradients
received at server x (and the same notation forHz) and g
(j)
i be the gradient received from worker i
at server j (only for this section).
In the following, we show that:
∃c ∈ R+, ∀
(
g
(j)
i
)
∈
(
R
d
)nw.nps
,∥∥∥MDA(g(x)1 . . . g(x)nw)−MDA(g(z)1 . . . g(z)nw)∥∥∥ ≤ c · max
(i,j)∈(Hx∪Hz)
2
‖gi − gj‖
Proof. Based on the definition of the MDA function (Section 1.2), let S be the set of the chosen
gradients by theMDA algorithm, i.e., with the minimum diameter among all subsets of size nw−fw.
Then, the aggregated gradient is given byMDA (g1 . . . gnw) ,
1
nw−fw
∑
g∈S
g.
Based on this definition, the following holds:
∃ (i, j) ∈ Hx
2, ∀ (y, v) ∈ S2, ‖y − v‖ ≤ ‖gi − gj‖ .
Then, observing that nw − fw > fw =⇒ ∃k ∈ Hx, gk ∈ S. Using the triangle inequality, we
have:
‖MDA (g1 . . . gnw)− gk‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥∥
 1
nw − fw
∑
g∈S
g
− gk
∥∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
nw − fw
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
g∈S
(g − gk)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
≤
1
nw − fw
∑
g∈S
‖g − gk‖
≤
1
nw − fw
∑
g∈S
(
max
(i,j)∈Hx2
‖gi − gj‖
)
≤ max
(i,j)∈Hx2
‖gi − gj‖.
18
Based on this, we have∥∥∥MDA(g(x)1 . . . g(x)nw)−MDA(g(z)1 . . . g(z)nw)∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥MDA(g(x)1 . . . g(x)nw)− gk + gk − gl + gl −MDA(g(z)1 . . . g(z)nw)∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥MDA(g(x)1 . . . g(x)nw)− gk∥∥∥+ ‖gk − gl‖+ ∥∥∥MDA(g(z)1 . . . g(z)nw)− gl∥∥∥
≤ 3 · max
(i,j)∈(Hx∪Hz)
2
‖gi − gj‖
Thus, ∥∥∥MDA(g(x)1 . . . g(x)nw)−MDA(g(z)1 . . . g(z)nw)∥∥∥ ≤ 3 · max
(i,j)∈(Hx∪Hz)
2
‖gi − gj‖ (2)
In plain text, this equation bounds the difference between aggregated gradients at two different
correct servers, based on the maximum distance between two correct gradients, i.e., aggregated
gradients on different servers will not drift arbitrarily.
3.3 BOUNDED DISTANCE BETWEEN CORRECT MODELS
To satisfy Equation 1 (the required assumption by MDA, Section 1.2), models at correct parameter
servers should not go arbitrarily far from each other. Thus, a global gather step (step 6 in Section 2.2)
is executed once in a while to bring the correct models back close to each other. Such a gather step is
close to the distributed contraction module of El-Mhamdi et al. (2019), which is based on applying
Median on both servers and workers sides (with the difference that the gather step appliesMeaMed
instead ofMedian and does not execute in all iterations).
In this section we quantify the maximum number of iterations that can be executed in one scatter
step before executing one gather step. From another perspective, the goal is to find the maximum
possible distance between correct models that still satisfies the requirement ofMDA on the distance
between correct gradients (Equation 1).
Without loss of generality, assume two correct parameter servers x and z starting with the same
initial model θ0. After the first iteration, their updated models are given by:
θ
(x)
1 = θ0 − γ1MDA
(
g
(1)
1 . . . g
(nw)
1
)
x
θ
(z)
1 = θ0 − γ1MDA
(
g
(1)
1 . . . g
(nw)
1
)
z
Thus, the difference between them is given by:∥∥∥θ(x)1 − θ(z)1 ∥∥∥ = γ1 ∥∥∥MDA(g(1)1 . . . g(nw)1 )
z
−MDA
(
g
(1)
1 . . . g
(nw)
1
)
x
∥∥∥
In a perfect environment, with no Byzantine workers, this difference is zero, since the input gradients
to theMDA function at both servers are the same (no worker lies about its gradient estimation), and
theMDA function is deterministic (i.e., the output ofMDA computation on both servers is the same).
However, a Byzantine worker can send different gradients to different servers while crafting these
gradients carefully to trick the MDA function to include them in the aggregated gradient (i.e., force
MDA to select the malicious gradients in the set S). In this case,
∥∥∥θ(x)1 − θ(z)1 ∥∥∥ is not guaranteed
to be zero. Based on Equation 2, the difference between the result of applying MDA in the same
iteration is bounded and hence, such a difference can be given by:∥∥∥θ(x)1 − θ(z)1 ∥∥∥ ≤ 3 · γ1 · max
(i,j)∈(Hx∪Hz)
2
∥∥∥g(i)1 − g(j)1 ∥∥∥ (3)
Following the same analysis, the updated models in the second iterations at our subject parameter
servers are given by:
θ
(x)
2 = θ
(x)
1 − γ2MDA
(
g
(1)
2 . . . g
(nw)
2
)
x
θ
(z)
2 = θ
(z)
1 − γ2MDA
(
g
(1)
2 . . . g
(nw)
2
)
z
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Thus, the difference between models now will be:∥∥∥θ(x)2 − θ(z)2 ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥(θ(x)1 − γ2MDA(g(1)2 . . . g(nw)2 )
x
)
−
(
θ
(z)
1 − γ2MDA
(
g
(1)
2 . . . g
(nw)
2
)
z
)∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥θ(x)1 − θ(z)1 ∥∥∥+ γ2 ∥∥∥MDA(g(1)2 . . . g(nw)2 )
x
−MDA
(
g
(1)
2 . . . g
(nw)
2
)
z
∥∥∥
The bound on the first term is given in Equation 3 and that on the second term is given in Equation 2
and hence, the difference between models in the second iteration is given by:∥∥∥θ(x)2 − θ(z)2 ∥∥∥ ≤ 3 · γ1 · max
(i,j)∈(Hx∪Hz)
2
∥∥∥g(i)1 − g(j)1 ∥∥∥+ 3 · γ2 · max
(i,j)∈(Hx∪Hz)
2
∥∥∥g(i)2 − g(j)2 ∥∥∥ (4)
By induction, we can write that the difference between models on two correct parameter servers at
iteration τ is given by:∥∥∥θ(x)t − θ(z)t ∥∥∥ ≤ τ∑
t=1
3 · γt · max
(i,j)∈(Hx∪Hz)
2
∥∥∥g(i)t − g(j)t ∥∥∥ (5)
Since g
(i)
t and g
(j)
t are computed at different workers, they can be computed based on different mod-
els θ
(i)
t and θ
(j)
t . Following assumption 5,
∥∥∥g(i)t − g(j)t ∥∥∥ is bounded from above with l ∥∥∥θ(i)t − θ(j)t ∥∥∥.
Noting that the sequence γt is monotonically decreasing with t→ ∞ (Section 2.1), Equation 5 can
be written as: ∥∥∥θ(x)t − θ(z)t ∥∥∥ ≤ 3 · γ1 · l τ∑
t=1
max
(i,j)∈(Hx∪Hz)
2
∥∥∥θ(i)t − θ(j)t ∥∥∥
Assuming that the maximum difference between any two correct models is bounded by K, this
difference can be written as: ∥∥∥θ(x)t − θ(z)t ∥∥∥ ≤ 3 · γ1 · l · K · τ
Now, to ensure the bound on the maximum difference between models, we need the value of∥∥∥θ(x)t − θ(z)t ∥∥∥ ≤ K. At this point, the number of steps τ = T should be bounded from above
as follows:
T ≤
1
3 · γ1 · l
(6)
T here represents the maximum number of iterations that are allowed to happen in the scatter step
i.e., before doing one gather step. Doing more iterations than this number leads to breaking the
requirement of MDA on the variance between input gradients, leading to breaking its Byzantine
resilience guarantees. Thus, this bound is a safety bound that one should not pass to guarantee
convergence. One can do less number of iterations (than T ) during the scatter phase for a better
performance (as we discuss in Section 6 in the main paper). Moreover, this bound requires that
the initial setup satisfies the assumptions of MDA. Having a deployment that does not follow such
assumptions leads to breaking guarantees of our protocol (as we show in Section 4 in the main
paper).
3.4 BYZANTINE MODELS FILTERING
This section shows that the filtering mechanism that is applied by workers (step 5 in Section 2.2)
accepts only legitimatemodels that are received from serverswhich follow the algorithm, i.e., correct
servers.
Such a filter is composed of two components: (1) a Lipschitz filter, which bounds the growth of
models with respect to gradients, and (2) a models filter, which bounds the distance between models
in two consecutive iterations. We first discuss the Lipschitz filter then the models filter; we show
that using either of them only does not guarantee Byzantine resilience.
3.4.1 LIPSCHITZ FILTER
The Lipschitz filter is defined in Step 5, Section 2.2. Roughly speaking, it runs on worker side, where
it computes the Lipschitz coefficient of the pulled model and suspects it if its computed coefficient
is far from Lipschitz coefficients of the previous correct models (from previous iterations).
The Lipschitz filter, by definition, accepts on average nps−fps models each pulled nps models. Such
a bound makes sense given the round robin fashion of pulling models from servers (by workers)
and the existence of (at most) fps Byzantine servers. Based on this filter, each worker pulls, on
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average, nps + fps each nps iterations. Due to the presence of fps Byzantine servers, this is a tight
lower bound on the communication between each worker and parameter servers to pull the updated
model. The worst attack an adversary can do is to send a model that passes the filter (looks like
a legitimate model, i.e., very close to a legitimate model) that does not lead to computing a large
enough gradient (i.e., leads to minimal learning progress); in other words: an attack that drastically
slows down progress. For this reason, such a filter requires nps > 3fps. With this bound, the filter
ensures the acceptance of at least fps + 1 models for each pulled nps models, ensuring a majority
of correct accepted models anyway and hence, ensuring the progress of learning. Moreover, due to
the randomness of choosing the value rj and the round robin fashion of pulling the models, progress
is guaranteed in such a step, as correct and useful models are pulled by other workers, leading to
computing correct gradients.
Based on assumption 5 and the round robin fashion of pulling models, a Lipschitz coefficient that is
computed based on a correct model is always bounded between two Lipschitz coefficients resulting
from correct models. Based on this, the global confinement property is satisfied (based on the prop-
erties of models that passes the Lipschitz filter) and hence, we can plug LIUBEI in the confinement
proof in Bottou (1998). Precisely, given assumptions 4 and 5, and applying Bottou (1998) (of which
these assumptions are prerequisite), the models accepted by the Lipschitz filter satisfy the following
property:
Let r=2,3,4, ∃A′r ≥ 0 and B
′
r ≥ 0 such that ∀t ≥ 0,E ‖gt‖ ≤ A
′
r +B
′
r ‖θt‖
r
,
where θt is the model accepted by the Lipschitz filter at some worker and gt is the gradient calculated
based on such a model.
3.4.2 MODELS FILTER
The Lipschitz filter is necessary, yet not sufficient to accept models from a parameter server. A
Byzantine server can craft some model that is arbitrarily far from the correct model, whose gradient
satisfies the Lipschitz filter condition. Thus, it is extremely important to make sure that the received
model is close to the expected, correct model. Such a condition is verified by the second filter at the
worker side, which we call the models filter. Such a filter is based on the results given in Section 3.3
and the local model estimation on the workers side.
Without loss of generality, consider a correct worker j that pulls models from parameter servers
θ
(i)
t ∀i ∈ [1 .. nps] in a round robin fashion. In each iteration t > 1, the worker computes a local
estimation of the next (to be received) model θ
(j(l))
t based on the latest model it has θ
(j)
t−1 and its own
gradient estimation g
(j)
t−1. The local model estimation is done as follows:
θ
(j(l))
t = θ
(j)
t−1 − γt−1g
(j)
t−1.
Without loss of generality, assume that worker j pulls the model from some server i in iteration t. If
such a server is correct, it computes the new model θ
(i)
t as follows:
θ
(i)
t = θ
(i)
t−1 − γt−1MDA
(
g
(1)
t−1 . . . g
(nw)
t−1
)
.
Thus, the difference between the local model estimation at worker j and the received model from
server i (if it is correct) is given by:∥∥∥θ(j(l))t − θ(i)t ∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥(θ(j)t−1 − γt−1g(j)t−1)− (θ(i)t−1 − γt−1MDA(g(1)t−1 . . . g(nw)t−1 ))∥∥∥
≤
∥∥∥θ(j)t−1 − θ(i)t−1∥∥∥+ γt−1 ∥∥∥MDA(g(1)t−1 . . . g(nw)t−1 )− g(j)t−1∥∥∥
Based on the guarantees given byMDA El Mhamdi et al. (2018), the following bound holds:∥∥∥MDA(g(1)t . . . g(nw)t )− g(j)t ∥∥∥ ≤ nw − fw2fw
∥∥∥g(j)t ∥∥∥ .
Based on the results of Section 3.3, the maximum distance between two correct models just after a
gather step is 34
nw−fw
fw
γ(T ·(t mod T ))
∥∥∥g(T ·(t mod T ))∥∥∥T . By induction, we can find the bound on
the value
∥∥∥θ(j(l))t−1 − θ(i)t−1∥∥∥ and hence, we can write:∥∥∥θ(j(l))t − θ(i)t ∥∥∥ ≤ γ(T ·(t mod T )) ∥∥∥g(T ·(t mod T ))∥∥∥(2((t mod T )− 1)+ (nw − fw)(3T + 2)4fw
)
.
(7)
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Thus, a received model θ
(i)
t that satisfies Equation 7 is considered passing the models filter. Such a
model is guaranteed to be in the correct cone of models in one scatter step. Note that such a filter
cannot be used alone without the Lipschitz filter. A Byzantine server can craft a model that satisfies
such a filter (i.e., the models filter) while being on the opposite direction of minimizing the loss
function. Such a model then will be caught by the Lipschitz filter.
Combining the Lipschitz filter and the models filter guarantees that the received model at the worker
side is close to the correct one (at the current specific scatter step), representing a reasonable growth,
compared to the latest local model at the worker.
3.5 PROOF OF LIUBEI
The algorithm works iteratively in two main phases, which we call scatter and gather phases. In
the scatter phase, each parameter server works on its own local data without communicating with
other servers. Also, workers pull the model from at most fps + 1 servers in each iteration, without
requiring to communicate with all other servers. Such a step lasts for T learning iterations. In
the gather phase, parameter servers communicate together to gather their models close to each
other, and workers also gather models from all parameter servers. Such a step is done for only one
learning iteration. Naively, if we do the gather step in all learning iterations, the algorithm becomes
very similar to GuanYu El-Mhamdi et al. (2019) (with even better guarantees due to the network
synchrony assumption), and the proof of convergence can be adapted directly (basically in this case
we do not need the filters). On the other extreme, if the gather step is never executed (i.e., only the
scatter step is executed), the models at different servers will become arbitrarily far form each other
(Section 3.3) and hence, the assumptions of the Byzantine-resilient GAR, i.e., MDA are violated,
leading to (possibly) divergence.
Based on this, the gist of the proof is to show that the maximum distance between models at correct
servers is always small enough to satisfy the assumptions of MDA. Based on this and the fact that
workers do SGD steps during the scatter phase, it is trivial to show that there is a progress in learning
between two gather steps, i.e., the loss function is minimized and hence, the proof is reduced to the
standard proof of SGD convergence Bottou (1998).
Formally, we show:
lim
t→∞
E
(
max
(x,z)∈[1 .. nps−fps]
∥∥∥θ(x)t − θ(z)t ∥∥∥) = 0
lim
t→∞
E
∥∥∥∇L(θ(x)t )∥∥∥ = 0
Proving these two equalities implies necessarily the convergence of the learning procedure, or for-
mally:
lim
t→∞
E ‖∇L (θt)‖ = 0
Proof. From Equation 7, we know that the difference between correct models is bounded by∥∥∥gT ·(t mod T )∥∥∥. Based on our assumptions (Section 3.1), limt→∞ ∥∥∥gT ·(t mod T )∥∥∥ = 0.
Therefore, lim
t→∞
max
(x,z)∈[1 .. nps−fps]
∥∥∥θ(x)t − θ(z)t ∥∥∥ = 0.
A direct consequence of Section 3.3 is that beyond a certain time tǫ (with ε > 0 be any positive
real number), the standard deviation of the gradient estimators as well as the drift between (correct)
parameter vectors can be bounded arbitrarily close to each other. More formally, the following holds
(and is a direct consequence of the limits stated above):
∃tε ≥ 0, ∀t ≥ tε,

E
(
max
i∈[1 .. nw−fw]
∥∥∥g(i)t − E g(1)t ∥∥∥) ≤ σ′ + ε
E
(
max
(x,z)∈[1 .. nps−fps]
2
∥∥∥θ(x)t − θ(z)t ∥∥∥) < εl
The first inequality provides the bounded variance guarantee needed to plug LIUBEI into the con-
vergence proof of Blanchard et al. (2017), and the second inequality provides the remaining require-
ment, i.e. the bound on the statistical higher moments of the gradient estimator as if there was a
single parameter. More precisely, we have the following, let (x, z) be any two correct parameter
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servers, using a triangle inequality, the second inequality above, and assumption 4 (bounded mo-
ments) we have (as given in Section 3.4):
∀t > tε∀r ∈ [2 .. 4] , ∃ (Ar, Br) ∈ R
2,
∀ (i, t, θ) ∈ [1 .. nw − fw]× N× R
d, E
∥∥∥g(x)t ∥∥∥ ≤ A′r +B′r ∥∥∥θ(z)t ∥∥∥r
whereA′r andB
′
r are positive constants, depending polynomially (at most with degree r, by using the
second inequality above, the triangle inequality and a binomial expansion) on ε, σ and (Ar , Br) from
assumption 4, allowing us to use the convergence proof of Blanchard et al. (2017) (Proposition 2)
regardless of the identity of the (correct) parameter server.
Convergence rate. Using MDA is shown to induce a convergence rate of
O(
√
nw−fw
nw
) El Mhamdi et al. (2018). We note that if we do the gather step in each itera-
tion (i.e., T = 1), this rate would not change since the MeaMed function will always choose a
correct model to proceed with. Moreover, the variance between models at the correct parameter
servers will be minimum (zero in the case of absence of Byzantine machines). Gathering the models
each 2 iterations (i.e., T = 2) doubles the distance between models on correct parameter servers
(in the worst case). By induction, doing the gather step after T iterations stretches the difference
between correct models by a factor of T in the worst case. Hence, the slowdown induced by the
filtering techniques only is O( 1
T
) and the convergence rate of LIUBEI is O(
√
nw−fw
nwT 2
).
4 VALIDATING THE BOUNDED GRADIENTS VARIANCE ASSUMPTION
To make progress at every step, any state–of–the–art Byzantine–resilient gradient aggregation rule
(GAR), that is based solely on statistical robustness, requires a bound on the ratio variance/norm
of the correct gradient estimations. Intuitively, not having such a bound would allow the correct
gradients to become indistinguishable from some random noise. This is problematic, since these
Byzantine–resilient GARs Blanchard et al. (2017); Su (2017); El Mhamdi et al. (2018); Xie et al.
(2018b) rely on techniques analogous to voting (i.e. median–like techniques in high–dimension): if
the correct majority does not agree (appears “random”), then the Byzantine minority controls the
aggregated gradient. For example, not satisfying these bounds makes the used GARs vulnerable
against recently–proposed attacks like A little is enough attack Baruch et al. (2019), which we ex-
perimented in Section 4.3 in the main paper. Such a bound is to ensure that, no matter the received
Byzantine gradients, the expected value of the aggregated gradient does lie in the same half–space
as the real gradient, leading for every step taken to more optimal parameters (smaller loss).
Here, we try to understand when this assumed bound on the variance to norm ratio (e.g., Equation 1)
holds, and when it does not. Themost straightforwardway to fulfill such an assumption is to increase
the batch size used for training. The question is then what the minimum batch size (that can be used
while satisfying such a bound) is, and whether it is small enough for the distribution of the training
to still make sense.
Methodology. We use the same setup, along with hyper-parameters, used in our evaluation of
LIUBEI (Section 4.2). We estimate over the first 100 steps of training the variance to norm ratio
of correct gradient estimations for several batch sizes. We plot the average (line) and standard
deviation (error bar) of these ratios over these 100 steps (Figure 8). We show the bound required
by two Byzantine-resilient GAR: MDA, and Multi–Krum Blanchard et al. (2017). We find Multi–
Krum a very good example on a widely–used GAR that unfortunately does not seem to provide any
practical4 guarantee, due to its unsatisfied assumption5. We also experimented with two values of
the number of declared Byzantine workers: f = 1, 5. Increasing the value of f calls for a tighter
bound on the variance to norm ratio.
Results. Figure 8 depicts the relation between the variance (of gradients) to norm ratio with the
batch size. According to such a figure, Multi–Krum cannot be safely used even with the largest ex-
perimented batch size, i.e., 256. Otherwise, the variance bound assumption such a GAR builds on is
not satisfied and hence, an adversary can break its resilience guarantees Baruch et al. (2019). MDA
gives a better bound on the variance, which makes it more practical in this sense: typical batch size
of 128 for example can be safely used with f = 1. However,MDA is not safe to use with f = 5 even
with the largest experimented batch size (b = 256). This is confirmed in Section 4.3 in the main
4At least on our academic model and dataset.
5It needs very low variance to norm ratio of correct gradient estimations, e.g. 0.08 for (n, f) = (18, 5).
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Figure 8: Variance to norm ratio with different batch sizes, compared to the bound/threshold required
by two Byzantine-resilient GARs: MDA and Multi–Krum. To satisfy a GAR assumption/condition,
the real variance/norm value should be lower than the GAR bound. For instance, MDA can be used
with batch-size=32 with f = 1, but not with f = 5 (as the real variance/norm value is higher than
theMDA threshold).
paper, where we show that an adversary can use such a vulnerability (due to the unsatisfied assump-
tion) to reduce the learning accuracy. Having the optimal bound on variance while guaranteeing
Byzantine resilience and convergence remains an open question.
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